Firms often undertake activities that do not necessarily increase cash ‡ows (e.g., costly investments in corporate social responsibility, or CSR), and some investors value these noncash activities (i.e., they have a "taste"for these activities). We develop a model to capture this phenomenon and focus on the asset-pricing implications of di¤erences in investors'tastes for …rms' activities and outputs. Our model shows that, …rst, investor taste di¤erences provide a basis for investor clientele e¤ects that are endogenously determined by the shares demanded by di¤erent types of investors. Second, because the market must clear at one price, investors'demands are in ‡uenced by all dimensions of …rm output even if their preferences are only over some dimensions. Third, information releases can cause predictable changes in the ownership mix, which in turn causes the in ‡uence of risk on expected returns to depend on expectations of CSR outcomes and the like. Fourth, information quality a¤ects managers' incentives to make cash-costly investments in non-cash activities. And …fth, the existence of investors with di¤erent tastes weakens the e¤ects of diversi…cation in a large market.
Introduction
The discounted cash ‡ow (DCF) framework provides the foundation for traditional asset pricing theories and suggests that a manager can maximize the …rm's stock price by maximizing the net present value of its cash ‡ows. In other words, the amount, timing, and risk of cash ‡ows are the main factors to consider, while the process with which cash ‡ows are generated is relatively less important. However, …rms'production processes inevitably generate externalities. Examples of these externalities include the risks of oil spills or chemical leaks, social value generated by providing small business loans or investments in underdeveloped areas, and environmental impacts of changes in production inputs. This paper explores …rms'asset prices and disclosure and investment decisions when some investors value a …rm's production externalities separately from its cash ‡ows. That is, we analyze the e¤ect of heterogenous investor tastes for the di¤erent dimensions of outputs that a …rm creates. Broadly de…ned, production externalities could include environmental e¤ects, corporate social responsibility (CSR), and positive or negative publicity about the …rm. While investors should value a dollar of cash ‡ows today similarly, the externalities generated by …rms'investments might be valued highly by some investors and ignored by others. We use a parsimonious model in which investors di¤er in how they value …rms'production externalities like CSR to investigate the e¤ects of investor taste on asset prices, corporate disclosures, and costly investments a¤ecting production externalities. To …x ideas, we focus on CSR as a motivating example.
Investor preferences for corporate social responsibility (CSR) are becoming increasingly important to the allocation of resources. The term CSR covers many of the examples listed above and generally covers a wide array of legal and "moral"responsibilities of …rms. Trillions of dollars are invested in socially responsible funds that tilt their portfolios in favor of …rms that act in socially responsible ways. 1 Evidence suggests that public pensions and socially 1 The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment reports that, based on research in mid-2012, "$3.31 trillion in US-domiciled assets was held by 443 institutional investors, 272 money managers and 1,000-plus community investing institutions that select or analyze their portfolios using various ESG [environmental, community, or other societal or corporate governance] criteria." (URL: http: //www.ussif.org/blog_home.asp?Display=6, accessed April 30, 2014). responsible investment (SRI) funds prefer …rms with higher CSR ratings while institutional investors overall prefer …rms with lower CSR ratings (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014) . In this paper we develop a model to explore the asset-pricing implications of di¤ering tastes among investors, building on Fama and French (2007) . Speci…cally, we assume that a representative …rm has a production technology that results in a stochastic dividend and an uncertain externality and that there are two types of investors. While all investors value cash ‡ows that are paid out today similarly, only a fraction of investors values the externality, which we model as a second output dimension. Consistent with the growing interest in socially responsible investment, we primarily interpret the second dimension as CSR performance and discuss alternative interpretations of the model below. 2 In this regard, our model departs from the CSR models of Baron (2007 Baron ( , 2009 ) that focus on …rms donating realized cash ‡ows.
Our model generates results concerning stock-prices, expected returns, …rm's investment choices, and the e¤ects of diversi…cation that di¤er in several ways from standard pureexchange CAPM-style models where investors'preferences are homogeneous.
Our analysis starts with a model of a pure exchange economy with a single risky asset and perfectly competitive, risk-averse investors. We assume that there are two types of investors who we label type 1 and type 2. The risky asset represents shares in a …rm that generates cash and engages in CSR activities. Cash ‡ows and CSR outcomes are uncertain, but we assume they are uncorrelated to focus on investor tastes rather than investors using CSR information to update their cash- ‡ow expectations. Allowing for correlation between cash ‡ows and CSR would not qualitatively a¤ect our general results. Investors have homogeneous information but heterogeneous tastes. All investors value cash ‡ows, but CSR activities are valued only by type-2 investors. The model features a trading round in which the price of the risky asset is established and a payout round in which the risky outcomes (e.g., a liquidating dividend and CSR performance) are realized and consumed by investors according to their share ownership. While we assume that type-2 investors derive utility from owning shares in socially responsible …rms, similar to Fama and French (2007) , we di¤er from Fama and French (2007) in that we assume that the utility that type-2 investors derive from these shares is not …xed but depends on the actual CSR performance. 3 We analyze the equilibrium share price and …nd that mean and variance of both output dimensions are priced as long as there is a non-trivial fraction of type-2 investors participating in the market. Since we analyze a model with a continuum of heterogeneous risk-averse investors, there is no marginal investor but, instead, the shares are priced according to the weighted average of investors' preferences. In a model with a unidimensional output and heterogeneous beliefs about the expected value of the output, stock price re ‡ects the average discounted value of expected cash ‡ows. In our model this is not necessarily the case because the impact of expected CSR outcome on share price depends on the uncertainty about both cash ‡ows and the CSR outcome. The reason for this result is an investor clientele (or shareholder-base) e¤ect: a higher expected CSR outcome encourages type-2 investors to take stronger positions in the risky asset. This allows cash- ‡ow risk to be more broadly shared but is associated with a greater fraction of market participants considering and pricing CSR risk. In other words, expected value and uncertainty of CSR performance a¤ect the composition of the …rm's shareholder base, and, therefore, a¤ect risk-sharing and prices. This implies that the relation between cash ‡ow variance and price depends on the expected CSR outcome. We extend the model in three ways. First, we allow for two rounds of trading to investigate the expected costs of capital and returns around information releases related to both cash ‡ows and CSR outcomes. We …nd that expected returns are not only a¤ected by how much information the disclosure provides about the cash- ‡ow and CSR outcomes in total but also by the amount of available information regarding cash- ‡ows relative to information about CSR. The relative amount of information matters because in expectation, the composition of the …rm's shareholder base changes as information about the two dimensions of …rm output becomes available. The expected change in composition depends on the relative amount of risk associated with the two outputs and the amount of risk resolved as information becomes available. Speci…cally, a more informative CSR disclosure increases the fraction of shares held by type-2 investors. Furthermore, this e¤ect is stronger when exante expected CSR performance is higher. The reason is that type-2 investors take stronger initial positions when the expected value of CSR performance is higher, and this e¤ect is ampli…ed when risk associated with this output dimension is reduced, for example through a more informative CSR disclosure. Essentially, there is a mean-precision complementarity with respect to the CSR outcome.
In a second extension, we investigate how taste di¤erences among investors a¤ect investment decisions by a manager who seeks to maximize stock price. We allow the …rm to make costly investments in CSR activities before investors trade. This could represent a …rm that sacri…ces expected cash ‡ows to protect the environment. 4 We …nd that, not surprisingly, the …rm will sacri…ce more expected cash ‡ows to boost its expected CSR outcome when more investors value the latter. Additionally, by investing in CSR, the …rm can a¤ect the composition of its shareholder base. Speci…cally, even though expected cash ‡ows have no direct e¤ect on the shareholder base, the increase in expected CSR outcomes attracts type-2 investors that crowd out holdings of type-1 investors. Taken together, the results from the baseline model and from the extension with the …rm's investment decision suggest that investment in CSR and investments in a reduction of the investors'assessed CSR risk go hand in hand. Speci…cally, (i) a …rm that has a higher expected value of CSR outcomes has an interest in decreasing investors'assessments of CSR risk (i.e., increasing the precision of its CSR disclosure) and (ii) a …rm that has a low assessed uncertainty about CSR outcomes should have a stronger incentive to invest in CSR outcomes since a larger fraction of its shareholder base will value this investment. Notably, result (i) departs from the standard pure-exchange model with homogeneous tastes where a …rm's interest in a¤ecting investors' assessments of risk is independent of expected output. When taste di¤erences are included this is no longer the case because a larger expected CSR outcome leads to a reduction in price for CSR risk.
In our third extension, we add a second …rm to the baseline model and assume that both …rms have CSR activities and cash ‡ows. Furthermore, while we continue to assume that cash ‡ows are not correlated with CSR outcomes, we allow for cash ‡ows and for CSR outcomes to be correlated in the cross-section. These assumptions allow us to approximate a large economy where one risky asset represents the market portfolio and the other asset represents a …rm that in a large economy is an in…nitesimally small component of the market portfolio. In standard pure-exchange models like the CAPM, such a setting leads to the wellknown result that the idiosyncratic risk of an individual …rm is not priced and, instead, only the exposure to systematic risk a¤ects a …rm's price. In our model, as in Fama and French (2007) , this is not the case. Here the extent to which systematic risks are priced depends on the …rm's idiosyncratic risk. Speci…cally, the idiosyncratic cash ‡ow and CSR uncertainties jointly determine the composition of the …rm's shareholder base and therefore determine how the …rm's shareholder base is a¤ected by systematic risk. Furthermore, since the expected CSR outcome a¤ects the shareholder base composition, it also a¤ects the extent to which systematic risks are priced.
Related literature
Closely related to our study, but not focusing explicitly on CSR, Fama and French (2007) show how disagreement and investor tastes (potentially driven by preferences for CSR) cause deviations from the traditional CAPM model. The deviations from traditional CAPMpricing result from the inability to de…ne a single market portfolio when investors with heterogeneous beliefs or preferences hold di¤ering portfolios in equilibrium. While their results on the e¤ects of tastes on diversi…cation are similar to ours, they focus on situations where investors either derive a non-random utility from their share holdings or where fundamental returns in ‡uence tastes for assets. In our setting the extra taste-based utility derived from share holdings is risky, because it depends on a risky CSR outcome, and does not depend on …nancial returns, because we assume additively separable utility and no covariance between fundamentals and CSR. As in Fama and French (2007) , our taste-based model is closely related to models featuring investors who disagree about the distributions of …nancial returns.
We discuss this and other interpretations of our model in Section 7.2.
Our model generates results related to recent studies on the importance of information about …rms'CSR activities and …rms'commitments to disclosing such information. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) and Dhaliwal et al. (2012) …nd that CSR disclosures a¤ect analyst following and the properties of analysts'forecasts, potentially by changing the demand for analysts indirectly through an e¤ect on the …rm's investor base. Serafeim (2014) …nds that …rms that integrate their reporting of …nancial performance and sustainability activities (i.e., a dimension of CSR) tend to experience a shift towards more long-term and less short-term institutional investors. Bénabou and Tirole (2010) discuss relations between individual and corporate social responsibility, and their potential bene…ts and costs to social welfare. They highlight the importance of information about CSR and how well-studied issues in …nancial reporting (e.g., reporting externalities, intermediaries, aggregation, and benchmarking) are also important to CSR reporting. Baron (2007 Baron ( , 2009 and Gra¤ Zivin and Small (2005) present models with investors who value …rms'charitable contributions or activities to mitigate externalities (termed "moral management") in a setting where investors can also contribute their own cash for similar purposes. These studies develop some results on how investor preferences for moral management can a¤ect stock prices that relate closely to special cases of our baseline model, but the focus of these studies is generally on why and how managers choose to engage in costly CSR activities including charitable donations. Bagnoli and Watts (2014) explicitly model uncertainty about a …rm's CSR activities, providing a justi…cation based on information asymmetry for CSR disclosures and assurance of such disclosures in a setting with both Bayesian and heuristic users of the disclosures. Their users are not necessarily investors and, as such, they do not model a capital market or pricing mechanism explicitly. In contrast, we focus on a capital market setting with symmetric information to show how information a¤ects returns and share holdings when some investors, while rational, gain utility from CSR (e.g., due to a consumption bene…t).
CSR disclosures could be related to returns because they are indirectly informative about the …rm's future cash ‡ows or because some investors intrinsically care whether a company, for example, pays a fair wage and provides acceptable working conditions to all of its employees. 5 However, Cheng et al. (2014) , Clark and Viehs (2014) , and Bénabou and Tirole (2010) note that the empirical evidence on the relation between CSR and corporate …nancial performance is mixed and inconclusive, potentially due to methodological di¤erences. While the associations between CSR and …nancial performance are important, our model abstracts from such links. Our focus is instead more aligned with recent research showing that CSR activities are associated with shareholder base or clientele e¤ects. Kim et al. (2014) , for example, provides evidence that …rms with higher CSR ratings have broader ownership in the sense of more institutional and individual investors holding the …rm's shares. They also …nd that higher CSR ratings are associated with greater demand for information as re ‡ected in Google and EDGAR search volume. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) …nd that …rms initiating disclosure of CSR activities, who presumably have positive CSR activities to disclose, tend to attract institutional investors. Robinson et al. (2011) and Hawn and Chatterji (2014) show that the addition of a …rm to the Dow Jones Sustainability Index is associated with positive abnormal returns, consistent with increased investor demand for shares of …rms with positive and visible CSR indicators. These …ndings corroborate our predictions that CSR is asso-ciated with investor holdings and that there is complementarity between …rm information (about both CSR and fundamentals) and investor demand driven by CSR expectations.
In the next section we introduce the basic model that has one trading round before the risky outputs are realized. Section 4 introduces a second round of trading in the same asset after information is released but before all uncertainty is resolved. This enables us to make predictions on the expected returns of a …rm without having to assume that the …rm's shareholder base remains constant. Section 5 introduces an investment decision such that the …rm chooses endogenously its exposure to non-fundamental risk. Section 6 introduces a second risky-asset into the pure-exchange economy and shows that the usual forces of diversi…cation are altered in that the idiosyncratic risk of a …rm a¤ects the …rm's shareholder base and, therefore, the extent to which systematic non-fundamental risk is priced. Finally, in Section 7 we discuss alternative interpretations of our model, derive implications beyond a CSR framework, and conclude.
The basic single-asset model
As a …rst step, we consider a two-period model with a single …rm: in the …rst period investors choose portfolios and in the second period the assets in the portfolios realize value. There is one risk-free asset, money, which has a constant price of 1 and one risky asset, which represents ownership shares in the …rm. We assume that the …rm generates per-share cash ‡ows ofx which result in a liquidating dividend. Furthermore, we express the outcome of the …rm's CSR activities in dollar terms asỹ per share. 6 We assume that all random variables are normally distributed, with
Cov [x;ỹ] = 0.
Cash ‡ows and CSR outcomes are not correlated. This precludes investors from using information aboutỹ to make inferences aboutx. Therefore, the zero-covariance assumption allows us to abstract from results that are based on usingỹ to learn about fundamentals represented byx. Allowing Cov [x;ỹ] 6 = 0 would not qualitatively a¤ect our results.
Investors and their preferences
There is a unit-mass of risk-averse investors who can invest in the …rm's shares and the risk-free asset. While all investors have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and valuẽ
x, only a fraction, 2 [0; 1], of the investors valueỹ. We distinguish investors by using the index i 2 f1; 2g to denote type-1 and type-2 investors. That is, type-1 investors have one-dimensional preferences over cash ‡ows and type-2 investors have two-dimensional preferences over cash ‡ows and the CSR outcome. Type-1 investors are indi¤erent across realizations ofỹ, while type-2 investors'utility depends non-trivially onỹ. We focus on a two-type setting as the simplest way to capture heterogeneous taste over production externalities or CSR. We assume that the utility of type-2 investors is multiplicatively separable
where q 2 and m 2 represent the quantities of shares in the risky and risk-free asset held by the type-2 investor, respectively, and p represents the …rm's price per share. Finally, a type-1 investor's utility is given by
Each investor maximizes her expected terminal utility subject to the budget constraint
it is straightforward to show that maximizing expected utility is equivalent to maximizing the following certainty equivalent
whereṽ 1 =x andṽ 2 =x +ỹ denote the value of the …rm's per-share outcome to type-1 and type-2 investors, respectively. This implies that V ar
. This would a¤ect the expressions for equilibrium demand and prices, but would not a¤ect the results, based on heterogeneous demand for shares across investor types, except in the knife-edge case that would cause equilibrium q 1 = q 2 .
Baseline equilibrium asset price
Solving the …rst order condition of (1) yields the optimal demand for a type-i investor:
Prices are set such that aggregate demand equals aggregate supply. There is one share per investor so that, on average, the following market-clearing condition has to hold
Proposition 1 shows the equilibrium stock price, which is derived by substituting investors' optimal demand into the market-clearing condition.
Proposition 1 The share price, p, is given by
Note that when ! 0, the price approaches that in the standard framework with only type-1 investors, i.e., p = x r 2 x . When ! 1, the price approaches that in a standard framework with y as a second cash ‡ow, i.e., p = x+ y r 2 x + 2 y . In general, all investors' portfolio decisions depend on their expectations and perceived risk, so the distributions of
x andỹ impact the relative holdings between type-1 and type-2 investors. Therefore, the higher the expected value ofỹ, the larger are the holdings of type-2 investors. Furthermore, the larger the uncertainty associated with the non-fundamental output, the smaller are the equilibrium holdings of type-2 investors.
The weights on y and r in (4) are given by y = 2
x 2
spectively. Note that r r represents the risk premium. To interpret y and r , we turn to the relative holdings of shares in the market. A naive guess is that a fraction are held by type-2 investors. However, this is not the case because individuals' holding decisions are determined by expected returns and the riskiness of returns, which vary across investor classes. In equilibrium, the per-share holdings of type-1 and type-2 investors are given by
The weight on y in (4), y , is in fact less than because CSR outcome risk causes type-2 investors to reduce their demand for the …rm's shares. Since only type-2 investors demand a risk premium for CSR risks, the weight on r in (4), y , re ‡ects a weighted average of 2
x and 2 x + 2 y . Speci…cally, the weighted average is given by
Note that y depends on the cash ‡ow risk, the CSR risk, and the proportion of type-2 investors. Therefore, the impact of type-2 investors on the pricing of expected CSR outcomes is the same as their in ‡uence on the pricing of the riskiness of CSR outcomes, consistent with their pricing power being driven by their positions in the risky asset.
Comparative statics results are described in the following corollary, which can be shown by taking …rst derivatives of the price expression in (4).
Corollary 1 Equilibrium share price is increasing in the expected value ofỹ, and can be increasing or decreasing in the fraction of type-2 investors and the variance of cash ‡ows and the CSR outcome: dp d y > 0, dp d / y r 2 y ? 0, dp
An increase in y increases the equilibrium price through two e¤ects that reinforce each other. First, y has a direct positive impact on price. Second, increasing y makes type-2 investors trade more aggressively which further increases the positive impact of y on price.
The uncertainty about cash ‡ows and CSR outcomes a¤ects how y in ‡uences price, since the uncertainties a¤ect the demands from type-1 and type-2 investors (i.e., the endogenous degree of investor clienteles). Speci…cally, the e¤ect of y on price is increasing in 2 x and is decreasing in 2 y . That is, an increase in 2 y causes type-2 investors to take weaker positions and to discount expected outcomes more. If y is positive (or not too negative), then this has a negative e¤ect on price. For su¢ ciently negative y (i.e., y << 0), the e¤ect of an increase in 2 y can be positive, since higher 2 y decreases the type-2 investors'shareholdings which, in turn decreases the negative in ‡uence of y on price.
Increases in the fraction of type-2 investors, , can have positive or negative e¤ects. The reason is that while type-2 investors include y in their valuation of the …rm's shares, they also include 2 y . Therefore, when the expected CSR outcome is su¢ ciently positive (i.e., y > r 2 y ), increasing the fraction of type-2 investors has a positive e¤ect on price because they impound the positive y more strongly into price. When this is not the case (i.e., y < r 2 y ), the negative e¤ect of an increase in type-2 investors is driven by an increase in the risk perceived by the …rm's shareholder base.
There are two potentially countervailing e¤ects of increasing 2 x on the …rm's share price.
First, an increase in 2 x increases the risk perceived by all investors. Second, an increase in 2 x increases the equilibrium share holdings of type-2 investors. The reason is that while higher values of 2 x decrease the demand of all investors (holding price constant) this e¤ect is stronger for type-1 investors. In equilibrium, price decreases and the total amount of shares held by type-2 investors increases. When investors have homogeneous preferences, an increase in risk has an unambiguously negative e¤ect on price (i.e., lim !0 dp d 2
However, when y is su¢ ciently positive (i.e., y >
x 2 y (1 ) ), the second e¤ect can dominate the …rst and an increase in risk associated withx increases the …rm's stock price.
Price reactions and expected returns around CSR disclosures
This section extends the baseline model in two ways. First, we allow for the disclosure of information regarding both cash ‡ows and CSR performance. Second, we assume that investors can trade before and after the disclosures. While modeling the release of information allows us to derive predictions on how CSR disclosure a¤ects prices, introducing a second round of trading allows us to discuss expected returns.
The standard approach to estimating expected returns in a single-period pure-exchange model is to compare the expected terminal output or liquidating dividend of the …rm with the …rm's stock price. While for a going concern there is no terminal cash ‡ow and returns are realized as the shares are traded on the market, the simpli…cation of focusing on returns in a static model is usually appropriate as long as investor preferences are homogeneous (i.e., as long as the expected stock price at any point in time equals the agreed-upon discounted expected value of output). In the long run, the uncertainty associated with every component of output will be revealed and priced accordingly such that the researcher can take the di¤erence between expected output and the …rm's stock price as realized returns.
In our model, however, investors with di¤erent preferences disagree about the economic returns between the trading round and the outcome realization round. The reason is that only some investors value CSR. One potential solution to the problem of calculating returns would be to use a weighted average based on investor preferences (e.g., ret total = ret 1 + (1 ) ret 2 ). However, this ignores investors'holdings, which determine prices. Since the composition of the shareholder base depends on the current assessed cash- ‡ow risk, CSR outcome risk, and expected CSR outcome, the composition of the …rm's shareholder base can change as information is released. In a one-period model, there is no scope for the shareholder base to change endogenously and, therefore, no scope for returns related to such changes. In a multi-period model, as we show below, a constant shareholder base only arises in knife-edge cases.
To capture the e¤ects of potential changes in shareholder base, we add a second trading period and assume that a …nancial disclosure and a CSR disclosure are released between the …rst and second trading rounds. Speci…cally, we extend the above model in the following way. Investors …rst trade in period 1 as described above. In period 2, information aboutx andỹ is revealed to all market participants through the disclosures and a second round of trading occurs. The outputsx andỹ are realized in period 3. Since investors are not wealth constrained and live for the entire life of the …rm without liquidity shocks, each investor's demand in each of the two periods can be computed independent of all other demands.
The revealed information in period 2 is given by two information signals which are independent of each other. Let the signals bẽ m =x +" m , and (8)
where" m and" n are normally distributed noise terms that are independent of all other random variables and have following properties:
Furthermore, let x = 1= 2 x and y = 1= 2 y be the prior precisions ofx andỹ, respectively.
This implies that the round 1 price can be expressed as
As before, demand is given by the solution to investors'wealth-maximization problem, which takes a similar form as in the baseline model. Let q i;2 be the shares held by a type-i investor after the second round of trade. Equilibrium second-period share demand from investor i is
where p 2 denotes the second round price. The posterior distributions are given by E [xjm; n] =
x x+m m x+ m , E [ỹjm; n] = y y +n n y + n , V ar [xjm; n] = 1 x+ m and V ar [ỹjm; n] = 1 y + n . Substituting the investors'demand into the market clearing condition yields the second round price in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Share price in the second period of trading after the revelation of informative signals m and n is given by:
The round 2 price in equation (14) consists of the updated expected value ofx minus the risk premium associated withx, plus a term related to the expected value net of risk associated withỹ. Since investors react to the disclosure of information, the price in Proposition 2 encompasses reaction coe¢ cients to the two disclosed signals. While there is ample literature on earnings response coe¢ cients (Kothari (2001) provides a review), to our knowledge we are the …rst to analytically develop a response coe¢ cient to CSR disclosure. Corollary 2 analyzes the market response to CSR disclosure.
Corollary 2
The price reaction to CSR disclosure is determined by the following response coe¢ cient
The CSR response coe¢ cient increases in the precision of CSR disclosure and in the fraction of type 2 investors. The CSR response coe¢ cient decreases in the precision of …nancial disclosure, the prior precision of cash ‡ows, and the prior precision of the CSR outcome.
Corollary 2 shows that some of the conjectures from the literature on earnings response coe¢ cients carry over to our CSR response coe¢ cient. That is, a higher precision of the report and a lower ex ante precision of CSR outcomes increase the price reaction to the CSR disclosure. Intuitively, a higher fraction of investors who are interested in CSR performance increases the price response to the disclosure. Furthermore, while CSR outcomes and cash ‡ows are not correlated in our model, the characteristics of the …nancial disclosure have an impact on the price reaction to CSR disclosure. The reason is the endogenous shareholder base composition. Speci…cally, if the posterior precision of cash ‡ows relative to CSR outcomes increases, then more shares will be held by type-1 investors, which reduces the price impact of the CSR disclosure.
Finally, note that the results concerning the precision of …nancial disclosure and CSR disclosure in Corollary 2 would carry over if we were to analyze the impact of CSR disclosure on returns. However, Corollary 1 shows that , x , and y all have an ambiguous e¤ect on the price in round 1. Therefore, changes in these three parameters can also have ambiguous e¤ects on the return reaction to CSR disclosure.
The second goal in this section is to examine the cost of capital, de…ned as expected returns from the …rst to second round of trading. This expected return is given in the following corollary
Corollary 3 The expected stock return, which we use as a proxy for cost of capital, is given
We express the expected change in price in (16) is that the composition of the shareholder base need not stay constant. Assume that the same relative amount of information is released about both output components, n y = m x , making the third term in (16) equal to zero. In this case the composition of the shareholder base remains constant, y is valued equally in both rounds, and, therefore, an increase in y reduces expected returns. When the amount of cash- ‡ow uncertainty that is expected to be resolved is di¤erent than that of CSR outcome uncertainty, the shareholder base changes and y receives a di¤erent weight in the second round of trading. This a¤ects the expected return, as shown in the following corollary. 
Interestingly, expected returns can be increasing or decreasing in y. Expected returns will be decreasing in y when there is more uncertainty resolved aboutx than aboutỹ between the two trading periods for any 2 (0; 1). When more uncertainty is resolved aboutỹ than aboutx (i.e., n y > m x ), expected returns may be increasing in y, but only if is su¢ ciently low. Low allows for large shifts in investor base involving more ownership by type-2 investors.
Investment decisions
Following the traditional pure-exchange asset pricing literature, in the analysis so far we have assumed that the …rm's cash ‡ow and CSR processes are exogenous and have analyzed various implications of allowing for heterogeneous investor taste. In this section we partly endogenize the …rm's production decisions. We return to the model with a single round of trading and allow the …rm to increase its expected CSR outcome by sacri…cing expected cash ‡ows.
To facilitate the analysis and provide clean intuition, assume that the …rm has a technology for transforming x into y according to a linear function with quadratic costs. The technology does not a¤ect uncertainty associated withx orỹ. Speci…cally, assume that the …rm can choose investment balance k 2 R and that the expected cash ‡ow and CSR outcome are given by
Note that k can be positive or negative. This technology can be thought of as shifting resources from cash- ‡ow-generating activities providing expected cash ‡ows of (1 k) x, to CSR activities providing an expected outcome of k y, at an increasing cost of adjustment, k 2 =2. The adjustment cost has to be paid in cash and, therefore, a¤ects the expected cash ‡ows and is relevant to all investors. Thus, the …rm can choose to increase its expected CSR outcome but sacri…ces increasing amounts of expected cash ‡ows in the process. In this setting, a …rm that chooses k = 0 is a traditional one-dimensional …rm that does not invest in CSR activities. A …rm that chooses k > 0 sacri…ces cash ‡ows to improve CSR, and a …rm that chooses k < 0 sacri…ces CSR to boost its expected cash ‡ows. Note that a negative k still has a quadratic cost which implies decreasing marginal returns to sacri…cing CSR. The optimal k will be interior because, at some point, the convex cost will outweigh the linear bene…t of transformation between x and y.
Assume that the …rm's manager makes the investment decision and is interested in maximizing the …rm's stock price, which is given by
Lemma 1 shows the manager's optimal investment choice.
Lemma 1 In our 2 period model with a linear-convex production technology the pricemaximizing level of investment is given by
The optimal investment in Lemma 1 shows that the manager trades o¤ the increase in valuation from increasing E [ỹ] with a decrease in valuation from reducing E [x]. A …rm with high x faces a higher cost of increasing y. Therefore, all else equal, when x is su¢ ciently high ( x y 2
x +(1 ) 2 y ), the …rm will choose to sacri…ce CSR in order to increase its expected cash ‡ows. For example, when the cash- ‡ow bene…ts from building an environmentally-unfriendly factory are su¢ ciently high, the …rm will build the factory by setting k < 0. Stockprice should increase as a result. However, the bene…t that a …rm derives from polluting the environment depends on the fraction of investors that are interested in preserving the environment (in our case, ) and how active these investors are in the stock market, which depends on the riskiness of both cash ‡ows and the CSR outcome. That is, Lemma 1 shows that even though the investment does not a¤ect assessed uncertainty, the optimal level of investment is a¤ected by both cash ‡ow and CSR uncertainty. Corollary 5 summarizes comparative static results for a …rm's optimal level of investment, k .
Corollary 5 The optimal level of investment in CSR is increasing in the fraction of type-2 investors, decreasing in CSR uncertainty, and increasing in cash- ‡ow uncertainty: dk=d > 0, dk=d 2 y < 0, and dk=d 2 x > 0.
Corollary 5 provides the intuitive result that the higher is the fraction of investors that are interested in CSR, the higher the investment in CSR activities will be. The results concerning 2 y and 2 x are both driven by their e¤ects on the trading behavior of type-2 investors. On the one hand, higher CSR outcome uncertainty makes type-2 investors hold a smaller fraction of the …rm's shares and, therefore, decreases the payo¤ to investing in CSR. A higher cash- ‡ow uncertainty, on the other hand, makes both types of investors trade less aggressively.
However, the demand of type-1 investors decreases more than that of type-2 investors which, in equilibrium, leads to a higher fraction of shares being held by type-2 investors. Therefore, a higher cash- ‡ow uncertainty increases the payo¤ to investment in CSR.
The last two comparative static results are particularly interesting in conjunction with the results concerning price levels and expected returns. The latter results point to the fact that a …rm with a higher expected CSR outcome has a stronger interest in decreasing the assessed CSR outcome uncertainty, for example by increasing the precision of its CSR disclosure. The comparative static result that dk=d 2 y < 0 shows that a …rm with lower CSR outcome uncertainty has a stronger interest in investing in increasing the expected CSR outcome. This suggests that, for example, CSR disclosure and CSR investments go hand in hand. In contrast, increasing the precision of disclosure related to fundamentals has the opposite e¤ect and decreases a …rm's interest in investing in CSR.
Limits to Diversi…cation
So far, our analysis has focused on a single-…rm setting and therefore cannot speak to the potential e¤ects of diversi…cation on asset prices. In this section we extend the model by including an additional …rm. We assume that the …rms'cash ‡ows are correlated and that their CSR outcomes are correlated but maintain our earlier assumption of no correlation between cash ‡ows and CSR outcomes. To capture some central features of a large-economy CAPM-style model, we assume that there are and (1 ) shares per investor of …rm 1 and …rm 2, respectively. Letting approach zero (i.e., in the limit as ! 0) approximates a setting in which …rm 2's shares represent the market portfolio, and …rm 1 represents a small …rm in a large market. Absent taste heterogeneity, all investors would hold approximately 1 share of the market portfolio and 0 shares of …rm 1, and only the covariance of …rm 1 with the market portfolio would be priced. As we show below, this is not the case in our model with taste heterogeneity, because idiosyncratic variances determine the composition of the …rm's shareholder base and, therefore, the extent to which covariances are priced. Fama and French (2007) also derive this result in settings with investor disagreement and heterogeneous tastes, focusing on how disagreement or tastes cause investors to deviate from choosing mean-variance e¢ cient tangency portfolios as implied by the traditional CAPM.
The two risky assets in this subsection are indexed by k = 1; 2. As above, the outcome of each of these assets is two-dimensional: asset k has a per share output of (x k ;ỹ k ). To simplify the analysis and show the intuition for the main point of this subsection we assume that
Furthermore, we assume that the cash ‡ows and the CSR outcomes of the two assets may be correlated. Finally, we extend our one-…rm assumption of Cov(x;ỹ) = 0 to the two …rm case by assuming that Cov(x i ;ỹ j ) = 0 8 i; j 2 f1; 2g. In other words, CSR performance is not correlated with fundamental performance but the fundamental and CSR outcomes of di¤erent …rms may be cross-sectionally correlated.
Therefore, the respective covariance matrices are given by 
As above, there is a unit mass of risk-averse investors that can invest in the …rms' shares and the risk-free asset and a fraction 2 [0; 1] of the investors has a non-zero preference over CSR outcomes,ỹ k . Lemma 2 summarizes the equilibrium prices.
Lemma 2 In our two-…rm economy, the prices of …rm 1 and 2 are given by the vector
where = ( ; 1 ) T denotes the supply vector and 1 = (1; 1) T .
Lemma 2 shows that, as above, when ! 0, the price vector approaches that in the standard framework, i.e., P = x1 1 r x 1 such that the price of …rm k is given by p k = x r ( k 2 xk + (1 k ) x12 ), where k denotes the shares per investor for …rm k, i.e., 1 = and 2 = (1 ). When instead ! 1, the price vector approaches that in the standard framework whenỹ is a second cash ‡ow, i.e.,the price of …rm k is given by
In order to simulate a large market where asset 2 represents the market portfolio and asset 1 represents an in…nitesimally small part of the market portfolio we assume that ! 0.
Note that in a situation with homogeneous tastes, e.g., when = 0, the prices of the two assets would collapse to p 1 = x r x12 and p 2 = x r 2 x2 . In other words, when the shares per investor approach zero for one of the assets in the conventional model, investors are perfectly diversi…ed with respect to idiosyncratic risk ( 2 x1 ) and only price systematic risk ( 2 x2 ) and the exposure to systematic risk ( x12 ), respectively. Proposition 3 shows that in a model with heterogeneous investor taste, the traditional forces of diversi…cation are limited.
Proposition 3 In our two-…rm economy with heterogeneous investor taste, the price of an in…nitesimally small …rm is a¤ected by its idiosyncratic risks.
Proposition 3 shows that even when we let approach zero such that the number of shares of …rm 1 per investor approaches zero, the price of …rm 1 is still a function of its idiosyncratic risks. Speci…cally, the …rm's idiosyncratic risks determine the pricing of y and the …rm's risk premium (or the weights on y and r in the price expression). This result can also be inferred from the solution in Lemma 2. Here, the risk premium is given by
Note that the risk premium is determined, in part, by the inverse of the weighted average of the investors' inverse covariance matrices. Firm 1's idiosyncratic risks ( 2 x1 and 2 y1 ) enter non-trivially, since the inverse of a sum of inverse matrices contains the elements of the main diagonal of the original matrices (even when ! 0). However, also note that this only happens when there exist taste di¤erences between investors; when = 1 and ! 0, for example, the price of …rm 1 reduces to p 1 = x + y r ( 12x + 12y ) such that only systematic risks are priced.
The reason that idiosyncratic risks still matter even when the forces of diversi…cation apply is that the composition of the …rm's shareholder base arises endogenously. Since the two investor groups are a¤ected by di¤erent risks, the extent to which systematic risks are priced depends on the composition of the shareholder base. The composition of the shareholder base, in turn, is determined by the …rm's total risks, not just its systematic risks. In a traditional factor model, the -factor is given by the correlation of the …rm's cash ‡ow to the market cash ‡ow. Our model implies that the -factor would not be given solely by the correlation but, instead, would be a¤ected by the …rm's idiosyncratic risks. Furthermore, it is impossible in our setting to express price as a linear function of the market portfolio variance, as in a traditional CAPM model (see also Fama and French, 2007) . Fundamentally, the existence of type-2 investors causes the type-1 investors to deviate from their otherwise optimal portfolio. Similarly, type-2 investors do not hold the portfolio that they would hold if all investors were type-2 investors. These deviations occur because the market must clear in equilibrium. Therefore, no investor holds the "market-portfolio" as the weights in their portfolios are a¤ected by the other investors'valuations and trading strategies.
7 Discussion and conclusion 7.1 Empirical Implications
Our results have a number of empirical implications for researchers interested in capital market implications of …rms'CSR activities and their disclosures about these activities. We discuss empirical implications of our model under alternative interpretations (e.g., whereỹ
represents other dimensions of investor taste) in the next subsection. All of the empirical implications we highlight are driven by shareholder base e¤ects that follow from our assumption of heterogeneous investor taste.
First, we …nd that investor tastes can cause …rms'market values to be increasing in the riskiness of their cash ‡ows, in contrast to the usual result that market value is decreasing in cash ‡ow risk. This is not a general result, but rather occurs only when the expected CSR outcomes are su¢ ciently positive. The mechanism underlying this result involves cash ‡ow risk deterring type-1 investors, allowing type-2 investors who value the …rms'high expected CSR outcome to have a more signi…cant in ‡uence on the …rm's share price. Empirically, this result can be operationalized in settings where CSR outcomes are likely to be a signi…cant driver of investment choices. 8
Second, we predict that market responses to disclosures about CSR will be stronger when the quality of (potentially concurrent) disclosures about fundamentals is lower. This results from the mix of type-1 and type-2 investors in the marketplace. When the quality of …nancial information is higher, more of the …rm's shares are held by type 1 investors.
The response to CSR disclosure is muted because a smaller fraction of the …rm's shareholder base values CSR performance. Additionally, when the market is primarily composed of either all type-1 or all type-2 investors, there is little scope for shareholder base e¤ects.
Therefore, the relation between market responses to CSR disclosures and the quality of cash- ‡ow disclosures is expected to be greatest when there are signi…cant portions of both type-1 and type-2 investors, and weakest when the market is dominated by either type-1 or type-2 investors (i.e., = 0 or = 1). These predictions can be operationalized in public stock markets with data on investor holdings (e.g., holdings of socially responsible funds) and proxies for the quality of CSR and fundamental disclosures.
In a setting where CSR disclosures are informative about cash ‡ows, we would also expect to …nd a negative relation between the market response to CSR disclosures and the quality of disclosures explicitly about fundamentals. To illustrate, consider a …rm that discloses a signal about fundamentals,m =x +" m , as above, in a setting without type-2 investors, such that CSR disclosures are used only to make inferences about cash ‡ows. In this example, market returns would be associated with the CSR disclosure as long as there is noise in the disclosure about fundamentals (i.e., V ar [" m ] 6 = 0). As the noise in the disclosure about fundamentals goes to zero the incremental information from the CSR disclosure disappears and the market ceases to react to the CSR disclosure. This mechanism, of substitution between informative signals, however, is very di¤erent from the mechanism we identify based on shareholder base e¤ects. We caution that an empirical study identifying a market price reaction to CSR disclosures should be wary about inferring that CSR disclosures are informative about cash ‡ows, because such a reaction could be driven by investor tastes and shareholder base
e¤ects. An e¤ective empirical strategy to disentangle the two competing explanations could test whether the distribution of the shareholder base a¤ects the negative relation between market reactions to CSR disclosures and the quality of disclosures about fundamentals. The e¤ect we identify is signi…cant only with a mix of type-1 and type-2 investors, while the alternative explanation based on signal substitution should be independent of the mix of shareholder types.
Third, we …nd that …rms'investments in CSR are complementary with CSR disclosures and dis-complementary with fundamental or cash ‡ow disclosure quality. Essentially, when …rms improve their expected CSR outcomes at the expense of expected cash ‡ows, they want the market to place more weight on CSR and less weight on cash ‡ows. Conditional on the distribution of type-1 and type-2 investors, …rms can achieve this goal by improving the quality of CSR disclosures to attract more type-2 investors, or by weakening the quality of cash ‡ow disclosures to deter type-1 investors and increase the proportion of type-2 investors. We therefore predict that …rms engaged in CSR activities will tilt their disclosure strategies to emphasize CSR and, if possible, weaken the quality of disclosures about fundamentals. Relatedly, if changes in disclosure standards increase the quality of mandated CSR disclosures, we predict that …rms will invest more in CSR activities, even at the expense of expected cash ‡ows valued by all investors.
Fourth, our results on the relation between idiosyncratic risk and price in a large economy with heterogeneous investor tastes suggests predictable variation in how well the CAPM holds across securities with di¤erent investor base characteristics. We predict that investor base heterogeneity is associated with deviations from CAPM-style pricing, consistent with Fama and French (2007) . When the investor base of a …rm has more mixed taste, we expect idiosyncratic risk to have more signi…cant price implications and for a factor model of returns to have less power. When the investor base has more homogeneous tastes (e.g., few or no socially responsible investors), a pricing model like the CAPM is expected to be more descriptive.
Alternative interpretations beyond CSR
Finally, we discuss applications of our model to areas beyond CSR where investor tastes have been shown to have an impact on demand for shares. Several empirical studies have documented areas in which di¤erences in investors'preferences a¤ect stock ownership in the cross-section. Graham and Kumar (2006) …nd evidence for age and tax clienteles related to dividends, whereby older and lower-income retail investors display a stronger preference for dividend yields than younger and higher-income retail investors. 9 Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) …nd that di¤erent classes of investors (local vs. foreign) display heterogeneous preferences for recent stock returns (engaging in momentum vs. contrarian investing strategies). Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) document investor preferences based on cultural and language similarity to management. Bushee (2001) …nds that institutional investors with shorter horizons display a preference for near-term earnings relative to long-term value. The investment "home bias" is a pervasive phenomenon, whereby investors prefer to invest in local stocks rather than foreign or distant stocks (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Huberman, 2001 ). While we focus on CSR, our non-cash- ‡ow outcome could straightforwardly be 9 Taste di¤erences in our model are closely related to the e¤ects of tax clienteles (e.g., Allen et al., 2000) but di¤er for a substantive reason. In our model,x andỹ could represent the payouts to two di¤erent groups of investors. In a model that captures tax-based clienteles,x andỹ would have to be perfectly correlated, because di¤erential income tax treatment of equity distributions implies that payouts to one group are proportional to (i.e., perfectly correlated with) payouts to the other groups. We assume that x andỹ are orthogonal to ensure that type-1 investors cannot useỹ to learn aboutx so that only type-2 investors incorporate information aboutỹ into their valuations. adapted to one of the applications above.
Investor tastes could also be related to insider status. Cohen (2009) …nds that employee loyalty in ‡uences individuals'portfolio preferences in favor of holding their employers'stock.
Insiders who obtain private bene…ts of control also can be interpreted as having additional tastes for owning shares beyond cash ‡ows available to all investors (e.g., Barclay and Holderness, 1989; Dyck and Zingales, 2004 ). An important di¤erence is that private bene…ts of control often involve information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, which would be between type-1 and type-2 investors in our model. Adding such information asymmetry would complicate our model and potentially alter some of our …ndings related to the importance of shareholder base.
We treat investor tastes as re ‡ecting a fundamental disagreement in valuation based on preferences, but operationally this could also be related to disagreement based on heterogeneous beliefs regarding the drivers of …rm value or behavioral factors that a¤ect subsets of investors (e.g., incomplete information as in Merton (1987) ). Investors can disagree about whether and how corporate governance policies a¤ect …rm value, for instance, or about how shocks to product markets and the competitive landscape a¤ect …rms. in the model,ỹ could represent observable board characteristics, like size and demographics, with investor disagreement about the relation between board characteristics and …rm performance. From a behavioral perspective, the model could be interpreted as capturing some investors' optimism, pessimism, or overcon…dence. With y = 0 and 2 y > 0 for example, the investors could be interpreted as having di¤erential perceptions of …rm risk, with type-2 investors perceiving higher risk than type-1 investors, who would be considered overcon…dent given their underestimation of risk. With y > 0 ( y < 0), type-2 investors could be interpreted as relatively optimistic (pessimistic) for reasons unrelated to …rm fundamentals represented bỹ
x. See Fama and French (2007) for further discussion of the similarity in the asset-pricing implications of di¤erences in investor tastes and di¤erences in investor beliefs.
Conclusion
This paper presents a simple model that examines the capital market implications of heterogeneous investor taste. We link heterogeneous tastes to several predictions related to asset prices, returns, and …rms'investment choices. Our results have implications for researchers and practitioners interested in investor clienteles (i.e., shareholder base e¤ects) and how endogenous clienteles a¤ect returns, reactions to information, …rms'investment trade-o¤s, and
diversi…cation.
An extension we plan to pursue in the near term is endogenizing investor demographics, by embedding the one-period model into a simple overlapping generations model with wealthrelated probabilities of investor survival and "birth". Our goal is to con…rm that both types of investors would survive in competitive markets. A secondary goal of such an extension is to examine how wealth dynamics driven by investing decisions and output characteristics (i.e., means and variances) would in ‡uence the equilibrium population proportions of di¤erent types of investors. We expect that conditions exist such that type-1 and type-2 investors will coexist in equilibrium, and that their long-run equilibrium population proportions would depend in interesting ways on the distributions of multiple dimensions of …rm output.
Proofs
Proposition (1): The …rst order condition to (1) with respect to demand in shares of the risky asset for an investor of type i is given by
Solving this for q i yields the demands in (2). Substituting q i into the market clearing condition and solving for p proves the claim.
Corollary (1) The expected change in price is therefore:
+ y (1 ) ( n x m y ) ( y + (1 ) x ) ( y + n + (1 ) ( x + m ))
Corollary (2): The respective derivatives are given by
(1 ) ( m + x ) + y ( y + n + (1 ) ( x + m )) 2 0,
(1 ) n ( y + n + (1 ) ( x + m )) 2 0, and Lemma (1): The …rst order condition is given by dp(k) dk = x k + y 2
x +(1 ) 2 y = 0. Solving for k proves the conjecture.
Lemma (2): Investors utility can be expressed as u i = exp r q T i v i + m i , i 2 f1; 2g
where r is their level of risk aversion, q i = (q i1 ; q i2 ) T represents the 2 1 vector of investor i's demand for shares in the 2 …rms, v 1 = x = (x 1 ;x 2 ) T , and v 2 = x + y = (x 1 +ỹ 1 ;x 2 +ỹ 2 ) T .
where w i is the initial wealth endowment and P = (p 1 ; p 2 ) T is the price vector. Note that the price per share of the risk-free asset, like its return, has been normalized to one. Substituting the budget constraint, it is straightforward to show that maximizing expected utility is equivalent to maximizing the following certainty equivalent
where Cov [v 1 ] = x and Cov [v 1 ] = x + y . The …rst order condition for an investor of type i is given by
such that the optimal demand for a type-i investor is given by
Prices are set such that aggregate demand equals aggregate supply and we assume that per investor there are shares of …rm 1 and (1 ) shares of …rm 2, where we denote = ( ; 1 ) T the supply vector. Therefore, it has to be the case that, on average,
(1 ) q 1 + q 2 = .
Substituting the optimal demands yields Therefore, the equilibrium price vector is given by
Proposition (3): Let ! 0, this implies that . The risk premium, RP 1 , contains both systematic and idiosyncratic risk. In other words, @RP 1 @ 2 x1 6 = 0 and @RP 1 @ 2 y1 6 = 0.
